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Abstract
This paper presents an approach to evaluating sensor placements to
maximize monitorability of the target system while minimizing the
number of sensors. The approach uses a model of the monitored system
to score potential sensor placements on the basis of four monitorability
criteria. The scores can then be analyzed to produce a recommended
sensor set. An example from our NASA application domain is used to
illustrate our model-based approach to sensor placement.
Introduction
Sensor placement is the task of determining a set of sensors which allows the most
accurate determination of the overall state of a monitored system while minimizing
sensor power consumption, cost, computing power requirements, and weight.
Reducing these quantities is particularly important in space-borne systems due to
power and payload restrictions.
This paper describes an approach to sensor placement based upon an extension of
techniques developed for sensor selection in monitoling as part of the SELMON
project [Doyle et al. 91]. These techniques have two components, an information
theoretic component and a model-based reasoning component. The information
theoretic component captures knowledge about unusualness and informativeness of
sensor data. The model-based reasoning component captures knowledge about how
observed data indicates future potential system behavior. This paper focuses upon
the model-based reasoning component of our sensor placement approach. In
particular, we describe how model-based reasoning enables evaluation of four
measures for evaluating potential sensor placements. Sensitivity Analysis suggests
sensor placements which measure quantities which have the greatest impact upon
the overall state of the system. Cascading Alarm Analysis suggests sensor placements
which measure quantities whose changes have the potential to cause many alarms.
Potential Damage Analysis suggests those sensor placements which measure
quantities which are likely to cause permanent damage to devices in the system
being monitored. Teleological Analysis suggests sensor placements which monitor
quantities directly applicable to specified goal functionality of the system. Our
approach uses a model-based simulation capability to evaluate how each sensor rates
with respect to each of these measures over the behavioral space of the monitored
system. These scores can then be used to generate a proposed sensor set.
This sensor placement evaluation capability provides a number of benefits. First,
this evaluation capability, will aid designers in the sensor placement task by
facilitating evaluation of alternative sensor placements. In particular, this
capability would provide a quantitative measure of tradeoffs in sensor placeme,ats
which previously have been viewed only subjectively. A second benefit is that
quantification of sensor placement measures will aid in design documentation by
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allowing quantitative justification for sensor placements. Third, the automated
evaluation capability will facilitate assessment of the impact of system design
changes upon sensor placements. Finally, as a fourth benefit, this sensor placement
evaluation capability can be used to aid in sensor power planning. When the utility
of a sensor depends greatly upon the operating mode of the monitored device, it may
be possible to reduce overall sensor power consumption by powering certain sensor
suites only in limited operating modes. Because our approach measures the utility of
sensors in each system operating mode, it can assist in sensor power planning.
The remainder of this paper consists of three sections. The next section begins by
describing how a model of the monitored system can be used to conduct a generalized
simulation and how this simulation can be used to evaluate the four sensor placement
criteria. The four sensor placement criteria are then described in greater detail. The
following section describes the testbed doma|n - the EnVit_0nmental Control and Life
Support System (ECLSS) for Space Station Freedom (SSF). _This section contains an
example illustrating how the sensor placement criteria apply to the mutifiltration
subsystem of SSF life support. The final section of the paper discusses outstanding
issues regarding our approach to sensor placement, compares our approach to
related work, and summarizes the key aspects of our approach.
Approach
Our approach to sensor placement is shown in Figure 1 and can be described
generally as follows:
1. Given nominal behavioral models of the system and a causal simulation capability,
generate a behavior space for the system.
2. Apply the sensitivity, cascading alarms, potential damage, and teleological analysis
for system operation over 'these operating modes.
3. Compute sensor placement recommendations as those with highest scores from the
analyses.
Our modelling uses a representation based upon [Doyle88]. In tlais representation, a
model consists of a number of devices; each of which has a set of associated
quantities. Mechanisms represent relationships between various quantities and are
instances of physical processes. Simulation proceeds by executing mechanisms
whose inputs change - possibly triggerifig other mechanisms. Mechanisms rnayl
change quantities, potentially with an associated delay. For example, fluid mowng
through a pipe may change the volume of fluid at the destination, but with a delay
related to the size of the pipe and the flow rate.
We now describe the Sensitivity, cascading Alarms, Potential Damage, and
Teleological analyses. The Sensitivity, Cascading Alarms, and :Potential Damage:i
analyses use the model to simulate the effect of changes in quantity values. The
effects of these changes are then analyzed to produce a Sensitivity, Cascading
Alarms, or Potential Damage score. The Teleological Analysis uses a specification of
the functional goal(s) for the system or subsystem along with an analysis of
dependencies among mechanisms in the model to produce a sensor placement score.
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Figure 1: Model-based Simulation Approach to Sensor Placement
Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity Analysis measures the sensitivity of other quantities in the monitored
system to changes in the current quantity. This measure depends upon information
about "normal" magnitudes of change for the devices in question. For each normal
operating mode of the system, the following procedure is performed. For each
quantity Q e MonitorableQuantities (the set of all monitorable quantities in the
model), determine nominal operating values and alarm ranges. Next compute a
normalized change increase AQ+ and decrease AQ- as the average amount of change
between updates for that operating mode. Next, for each quantity Q, beginning with
a simulation with all devices/sensors at nominal operating values, using simulation
provided by the model, simulate a change AQ in Q, propagating this change to other
quantities in AllQuantities (the set of all quantities in the model) as dictated by the
model. For each such changed quantity Q' e AllQuantities, for each time the quantity
changes during the simulation, collect a sensitivity score proportional to the amount
of change in Q' from its normal value Q'nominal relative to alarm thresholds but also
modified by a decreasing function of time 1. This calculation captures the
characteristic that delayed and less direct effects are more likely to be controllable
and less likely to occur. Thus, a change which affected a quantity Q' but occurred
slowly is considered less important. This simulation proceeds for a preset amount of
simulated time. Then, for each changed quantity Q', take the maximum of the
collected change score for that quantity. The sensitivity score for Q is the sum of
these maximums for all the Q's. Thus, for each quantity Q, a simulated change
produces a set of changescores for each other quantities in the model. The
1This can be viewed as an average 3Q'/_Q modified by a decreasing function of time elapsed and
normalized for the alarm threshold for Q'.
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sensitivity score for Q is the sum of the respective maximums of each of these sets 2.
The computation of the sensitivity scores is shown below:
Simulate a change AQ+ or AQ- to Q beginning at time 0 and continuing to time
AT (a user-supplied default).
For each change to a quantity Q' occurring at time Tchange, compute a change
score as follows.
let Q'new be the new value for Q'
IQ'new - Q'nominall (AT - Tchange)
changescore(Q') = ...................... x ..... , ........
IQ'alarm - Q'nominall AT
add this changescore to the set of collected changescores for Q'
let MaxChangeScore(Q') = the maximum of the set of collected changescores for Q'
let sensitivity(Q) = _ MaxChangeScore(Q')
Q'e AllQuantities
The overall sensitivity score for Q is then computed by summing the sensitivity
scores for AQ+ and AQ- weighted by relative frequency of increase vs. decrease for Q.
Cascading Alarms Analysis
Cascading alarms analysis measures the potential for chang e in a single quantity to
cause a large number of alarm states to occur, thus causing information overload and
confusion for operators. As with sensitivity analysis, cascading alarms analysis is
performed for each operating mode of the monitored system. For a standardized
amount of increase and decrease for each monitorable quantity Q, the effects of such
a change are propagated throughout the system and the number of triggered alarms
is counted. This standardized amount of change is different from the measure used in
the sensitivity analysis as normal changes are not likely to produce cascading aia_
patterns. The alarm count is then normalized for the total number of possible alarms.
The weight of each alarm state triggered is also decreased as a function of the time
delay from the initial change event tO the alarm. This has the effect of focussing this
measure on quickly developing cascading alarm sequences which are the most
difficult to interpret and diagnose. The computation of cascading alarms scores is
shown below.
Simulate a change AQ+ or AQ- to Q beginning at time 0 and continuing to time
AT (a user-supplied default); where AQ+ and AQ- are functions of the
distance between the nominal value for Q and the alarm value for Q
in the increasing and decreasing directions respectively
2Quantlties which do not change when Q is changed produce an empty set of changescores.
define the maximum of this empty set as 0 for the purpose of the sensitivity summation.
We
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let CascadingAlarm(Q) =
InAlarm(Q')
Q'e all quantities
..............................
number of quantities Q'
where InAlarm(Q') = (AT -Talarm)/AT
if Q' entered an alarm range during the simulation
and Talarm is the earliest time Q' was in an alarm range
and
InAlarm(Q') = 0
if Q' did not enter an alarm range during the simulation.
Potential Damage Analysis
Another measure is potential damage, which is measured in two parts predictive
potential damage and potential damage detection. Predictive potential damage
measures the capability of the sensor to predict damage to devices in the system. For
each device and quantity associated with that device, there is an associated operating
range which is judged to be harmful to the device. Predictive potential damage
analysis is performed by simulating a change in each monitorable quantity Q and
scoring upon the basis of how many devices will enter harmful ranges due to the
change in Q. Predictive potential damage analysis scores are moderated by the
number of control points which may interdict the damage (defined as a mechanism
directly influenced by a directly controllable quantity). For the causal path leading
to the damaged device, for each mechanism which depends upon a control parameter,
the potential damage score is reduced. The potential damage measure depends more
critically upon domain-specific information beyond the schematic, as many of the
potential damage scenarios involve device or subsystem interactions. The
computation of potential damage scores is shown below.
Simulate a change AQ+ or AQ- to Q beginning at time 0 and continuing to time
AT (a user-supplied default).
let PotentialDamagel(Q) = Damaged?(Q')
Q'e all quantities
where (AT - Talarm)
Damaged?(Q') ......................
AT x (control + l)
if Q' entered a damaging range during the simulation
where Talarm is the earliest time Q' was in a damage range
and control is the number of control points in the causal
chain leading to the damaging quantity value
and
Damaged?(Q') = 0
if Q' did not enter a damage range during the simulation.
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The second part of potential damage analysis is damage detection. In this measure,
the model is used to simulate devices in the system entering damaging operating
modes, and potential sensors are scored upon the basis of how much they change (in
the same manner as the sensitivity analysis). Damage detection analysis is
performed by propagating a change resulting in a device entering a damaging
range, and measuring the resulting change in sensor reading as in the sensitivity
analysis. Those sensors which change more significantly to indicate the damaging
device state are scored higher by the damage detection analysis.
Let AQ'+ or AQ'- be changes sufficient to cause Q' to enter a device damaging range.
Simulate a change AQ'+ or AQ'- to Q' beginning at time 0 and continuing to time
AT (a user-supplied default).
let PotentialDamage2(Q) = _ Changescore(Q)
Q'e all quantities
The final measure is teleological analysis, which does not use the model-based
simulation capability. Instead, the teleological analysis examines the mechanism
dependencies to produce a sensor placement score. In some cases, some aspects of the
purpose of the monitored system can be specified in terms of quantities in the model,
some of which may be monitorable quantities. The teleological analysis measure
suggests measurements of quantities most closely linked to the functional goals of the
system being monitored. In this measure, those quantities directly mentioned in the
functional specification of the system are scored highest, those quantities directly
influencing these quantities are scored next highest, etc. The exact computation of
the teleological measure involves backtracing the causal graph. Directly
monitorabie quantities appearing in the goal description receive a score of 1. For
each mechanism affecting the goal quantity, a teleology score inversely
proportional to the number of such mechanisms is then divided equally among the
inputs to the mechanism. Thus, if there are M mechanisms affecting a goal quantity,
and one of these mechanisms has N inputs, each such input will receive a score
1/MN. Note that m-tilflple causal influence paths will combine additively. While this
process proceeds recurs|vely for the mechanisms potentially influencing the inputs
to this mechanism, each level is multiplied by I/D where D is the number of
mechanisms distant from the goal quantity.
The sensor placement scores computed by evaluating these four measures can be
used in two ways. First, design engineers can use these scores directly to aid in their
decision making process. Second, these scores can be combined in a utility function
to rate the desirability of each potential sensor placement. The sensor placement
task can then be viewed as maximizing the utility function within certain cost
constraints (e.g. weight, power consumption, computing resources, cost, etc.). While
task the contextwe are currently investigating the_sensor placement _ within of the
first approach (e.g. development of a sensor placement evaluation tool), we expect
the resulting evaluations to be applicable to the second task.
Domain and StafuSl
Our sensor piacemefit approach is being tested upon the Water reciamation subsystem
of the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) for Space Station
Freedom. A model describing the behavior of the multifiltration (MF) subsystem in
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terms of fluid flow and heat transfer has been constructed. This model was developed
via a combination of study of design documentation (i.e. schematics, etc.) and
consultation with domain experts (e.g. the operators of the testbed). This model has
been validated by comparison against actual data from the subsystem testbed
undergoing evaluation at the Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama.
We are also in the process of extending our model to cover more of the ECLSS
subsystems.
Figure 2 below shows the ECLSS multifiltration (MF) subsystem. The MF subsystem
consists of two main parts - the sterilization loop and the unibed assembly. In the MF
subsystem, the water first passes through a pump at the inlet to the system. Next, the
water passes through a coarse filter before entering the sterilization loop. In the
sterilization loop the water is heated in the regenerative heat exchanger and then by
the in-line heater after point 3. The in-line heater has only a coarse temperature
control and thus the water temperature at point 4 may differ as much as 10 ° F from
the goal of 250 ° F. Within the sterilizer reservoir, the temperature of the water is
maintained more accurately at 250°F for about 9 minutes. In the second portion of
the subsystem, the water passes through a set of unibed filters designed to remove
particulate contaminants from the water. Possible sensor types are flow rate, water
pressure, temperature. Possible sensor locations are indicated in Figure 2 by
numbered ovals.
Specified functional goals are:
1. maintain processed water at 250°F in sterilizer reservoir for 9, minutes; and
2. maintain water flow through the unibed of at least 15 mL/minute.
-- Potential Sensor
Pump Pre-Filter . Pwr
Inlet _ Regenerative _H atExchanger
Relief
Valve
Unibed Pwr
D,.Outlet
Figure 2: Multifiltration Subsystem
In this example, Damage Detection Analysis suggests placing a temperature sensor at
point 4. This is because if the in-line heater overheats and enters a damaging
temperature range, it would cause the water flowing through the in-line heater to be
heated to a higher temperature than normal, thus causing a significant temperature
increase at point 4.
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Sensitivity Analysis scores highly the placement of a flow rate sensor anywhere in
the MF because the flow rate affects many other quantities. The flow rate affects the
temperature at each of the potential sensor placement points in that the flow rate
affects the heat loss in the pipes. The flow rate also affects the speed of the
temperature propagation from the fluid flow (e.g. delays for temperature changes).
Sensitivity Analysis also suggests the more specific placement of a pressure sensor
near the relief valve at point 7. This is because the relief valve is pressure
controlled; if the pressure at point 7 is above 40 psig, the relief valve will open and
drastically change the system behavior. The opening of the relief valve would cause
an immediate significant pressure loss, as well as significantly affecting flow in the
MF subsystem.
Teleological Analysis suggests placing flow rate sensors to verify the flow of water
through the unibeds as the flow rate is directly mentioned in the goal specification.
Teleological Analysis also highly scores a flow rate sensor in the sterilizer reservoir,
as this quantity determines the time spent by the water in the sterilizer reservoir.
Teleological Analysis also scores slightly lower, flow rate sensors at any of the other
locations, as in normal operation the flow rate is the :same at all of the potential
sensor locations. Finally, Teleological Analysis also suggests placement of a
temperature sensor for the sterilizer reservoir, as this quantity appears in the
functional goal specification of the system.
While the MF subsystem model has been completed and verified against actual testbed
data, the sensor placement scoring algorithms are currently being implemented.
When finished, the sensitivity, cascading alarms, potential damage, and teleological
measures will then be tested on the current testbed configurations with domain
experts evaluating the accuracy and utility of the sensor preference criteria.
Discussion and Conclusion
The research described in this paper is preliminary, hence there are a number of
outstanding issues left to future work. One issue is that of the computational expense
of simulation. While we are currently implementing a generalized simulation
capability for all behavioral modes, this approach may be intractable for more
complex systems Hierarchical simulation schemes and/or Monte Carlo sampling of
the behavior space are currently being examined as approaches to dealing with this
problem.
Another difficulty is determining how far forward to Simulate for the sensitivity,
cascading alarms, and potential damage analyses. Additionally, how large of a
quantity change to propagate is another issue. Currently, both of these are
parameters which may be changed by the user. However, ideally, the system would
be able to determine appropriate values for these parameters.
Our work in sensor placement for monitorability is also relevant to issues in design
for diagnosability. Because methods for ensuring diagnosability depend upon
completeness of fault models, if fault models are incomplete, sensor placement based
solely upon diagnosability criteria may make it difficult to detect and diagnose
unforseen misbehaViors. Thus an approach to sensor placement based only on
cfiieria of diagnosabiiity may result in sensor configurations which do not Support
safe system operation. This is an important point about the difference between
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monitoring and diagnosis, or the difference between anomaly detection and
troubleshooting. The goal of sensor placement for diagnosability is to ensure that
sensor data to support the diagnosis of known faults will be available to operators.
However, as the history of the Voyager mission tells [Laeser et al. 86], the potential
for unforeseen faults with obscure manifestations always exists. There will be no
substitute for years of experience and troubleshooting expertise on the part of
domain experts in handling successfully these most difficult and potentially fatal
cases.
In accordance with this observation, we are developing a comprehensive approach
to sensor placement based upon both diagnosability and monitorability. This paper
has described our work in design for monitorability in which the goal is to provide
operators with high information content sensor data and/or sensor data which
report on critical causal pathways in the device, without reference to fault models.
Information-theoretic monitorability criteria capture knowledge about unusualness
and informativeness of sensor data and the four model-based reasoning
monitorability criteria described in this paper capture knowledge about how
observed data indicates future potential system behavior. Although sensor
placement based on monitorability does not provide a comprehensive solution to the
problem of unforeseen faults, the intent is to provide experienced operators with the
most generally informative sensor data and to avoid having sensor placements be
wired into an inevitably incomplete set of fault models.
In a parallel effort, we are also examining the use of fault models to evaluate sensor
placements from a diagnosability standpoint [Chien & Doyle91]. These methods
complement the sensor placement for monitorability approach described in this
paper. Thus, in those cases where fault models exist, a diagnosability analysis will
incorporate such knowledge in sensor placement recommendations. For example,
the types of interactions addressed by the Cascading Alarms and Potential Damage
Analyses can be focussed by fault model information (by indicating which such
interactions are likely to occur). Thus, fault model information is used in the
diagnosability analysis. However, because monitorability analysis does not use fault
models, it offers better coverage of unforseen faults.
Other work on sensor placement includes [Scarl91a, Scarl91b]. Scarl's work focuses
upon two issues: 1) discrimination of faulty sensors (and hence faulty sensor data)
from the occurrence of regular system faults; and 2) deriving minimal sensor sets to
cover known fault sets. In contrast, our work focuses upon quantifying how well
proposed sensors meet general monitorability criteria. Other relate work includes
work on teleology and model-based reasoning [Sticklen et al. 89, Franke89, Sun &
Sticklen90]. Sensor placement for monitorability is also related to design for
testability [Wu88, Shirley88]. In this work, design constraints for digital circuits are
derived from testability constraints. This work differs from our work in several
respects. First, we are concerned with monitoring systems with continuous
quantities. Second, issues of time criticality arise in our domain. And third, we are
also concerned with monitoring in non-faulted modes.
This paper has described a model-based reasoning approach to evaluating sensor
placements from the standpoint of monitorability. In this approach, potential sensor
placements are evaluated using four criteria. Sensitivity Analysis suggests
monitoring of quantities which, if changed, significantly affect overall system state.
Cascading Alarms suggests monitoring of quantities which may lead to rapidly
developing alarm sequences. Potential Damage suggests sensors which monitor
quantities which predict or detect damage to devices in the monitored system. And
I7
Teleological Analysis suggests monitoring of quantities more directly causally linked
to the specified goal functionality of the system.
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